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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.
2
SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.*
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY."
SUPREME COURT COMMISSION OF OHIO.5
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ACTION.
New Promise to remove Discharge.-The promise by which a dis-
charged debt of a bankrupt is revived must be clear, distinct and un-
equivocal. It may be an absolute or a conditional promise, but in either
case it must be unequivocal, and the occurrence of the condition must
be averred if the promise be conditional: St. John v. Stephenson, 90Ill.
BANKRuPTCy. See Action.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Due Diigence to chiarqe Endorser.-Where a notary makes inquiry
at the bank where paper is payable, and receives information from the
cashier as to the residence of the endorser, upon faith of which the
notary addresses the notice of protest, the jury are justified in finding
that he has used due diligence: Herbert v. 8ervin, 12 Vroom.
3 Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1879. The cases will probably be reported in 10 or I1 Otto.
2 From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 90 111s. Reports.
3 From Henry A. Chaney, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 38 MIch. Reports.
4 From G. D. W. Vroom, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 12 of his Reports.
5 From E. L..De Witt, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 33 Ohio St. Reports.
19 From J. W. Rowell, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 51 Vermont Reports.
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An agreement between the holder of the note and a creditor of the
maker, by which the holder was to accept fifty per cent. of his claim, to
be secured by mortgage, which said assumption by the creditor so
secured should be in full satisfaction of the holder's claim against the
maker, does not discharge the endorser because the maker is a stranger
to the agreement: Id.
Partnership Note in lieu of Note of a Tror Firm.-Where parties
succeeding in a partnership to all the rights and liabilities of a former
firm, give new notes in lieu and satisfaction of a debt of such firm, the
payment of which they had assumed, their liability to pay the debt will
be a sufficient consideration for the notes: Silverman v. Chase, 90 Ills.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Construction of State Constitution by United States Courts-Deci-
sions of State Courts followed.-Where the U. S. Supreme Court con-
strues a state constitution in ignorance of the fact that the highest
tribunal of the state has given a different construction it will in a sub-
sequent case follow the construction given by the state courts when it
appears that such construction has become a rule of property and that
no rights have been acquired which will be affected by the change of
decision : Fairfield v. County of Gallatin, S. C. U. S. Oct. Term 1879.
CONTRACT.
W'hen not Implied for Services-Family Relation.-When one person
goes to reside with another as a member of his family, with the under-
standing that he is simply to go and come as he pleases, and work as
he pleases, and be treated and entertained as a member of the family,
there is no presumption that he intends to charge for what he does, nor
that he is to be charged for what he receives. If he designs to change
this relation, he must notify the other party: Dunlap v. Allen, 90 Ills.
Implied Promise.-Plaintiff proposed to defendant that he take plain-
tiff and his wife to board, and, as defendant's wife, who owned the place
where she and defendant lived, wished to repair and alter her house
before taking them, offered to let defendant have money for that pur-
pose. He accordingly paid defendant money to be so expended, and
paid money for labor and materials so used, and delivered to defendant
certain wood, hay, grain and sugar. Defendant was then insolvent, and
known by plaintiff to be so, and he never expressly promised plaintiff to
pay him for any of the charges, but plaintiff expected to be paid in full,
either by board, or by board and money, from defendant's wife,,to make
up the deficiency. .eld, that as the money, &c., expended on the house,
was furnished not at the request, nor for the benefit, nor on the credit
of the defendant, but on the credit of the wife, and for her benefit and
the benefit of her separate property. the law would imply no promise on
defendant's part to repay it; but that as the wood, &c., was furnished
to defendant for the use of his family, it was for his benefit, and the law
would imply a promise on his part to pay therefor: Roberts v. Kelley,
51 Vt.
CORPORATION. See Mandamus; Recezver.
Subscribers to Stock- Cannot release themselves as against Creditors.
-Subscribers to the capital stock of a corporation cannot release them.
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selves from payment, when such subscriptions are necessary for tLe pay-
ment of corporate debts: Gaff v. Fes'er, 33 Ohio St.
If the corporation has been regularly authorized, creditors having dealt
with it, may enforce payment of subscriptions, although the subscribers
may have notified the company that they would not be liable for debts,
upon the assumption that the corporate existence was without authority
of law : Id.
COVENANT.
Agreement by Grantee to pay Encumbranc.-A person taking, as
grantee, a deed of conveyance containing a stipulation that he will pay
the money due on a certain mortgage then on the property, may be sued
by the grantor in covenant for the breach of such stipulation: Golden
v. Knapp, 12 Vroom.
Quere. As to the amount of damages recoverable if the mortgage has
not been paid off by the grantor: Id.
CRIIAL LAW.
Cbesn'racy.-A conspiracy to slander a person by charging him with
a criminal offence is indictable: State v. Hiciding et al., 12 Vroom.
The statute, in requiring an overt act, does not require full execution
of the conspiracy in order to make it punishable: 7d.
Crimes arising under the Revenue Laws-Statute of Limitations.-
The offence of falsely entering goods at the custom house, defined by
sect. 5445, U. S. Rev. Stat., is a crime "arising under the revenue
laws," within the meaning of sect. 1046 ; but the offence of conspiring
to defraud the United States, defined by sect. 5440, is not. An indict-
ment for the latter offence must, therefore, be found within the three
years limitation prescribed by sect. 1044: United States v. Hirsch et al..
S. C. U. S. Oct. Term 1879.
DAMAGES. See Libel.
Nuisance to Property by Railroad Tracks.-In an action to recover
damages caused to a house and lot by the construction and operation of
railroad tracks in a street in close proximity to the plaintiff's property,
the true measure of damages is the loss sustained by the nuisance, the
injury from jarring the building, and the throwing of cinders and
smoke upon the plaintiff's premises, and the depreciation of the value
of the property by these causes may be considered, but not general de-
preciation in value from other causes, such as mere inconvenience in
approaching or leaving the property, or the noise and confusion in the
vicinity. The injury must be physical: C. H & St. P. Railroad Co.
v. Hall, 90 Ills.
ELECTION.
'Votes for Office not known to be Vacant by the Body of Voters.-At
an election for city officers, held in Plainfield, in December 1878, the
relator received twenty-six votes out of a poll of over eight hundred.
The relator claims that there was a vacancy in the office of city judge,
and that therefore he was duly elected, having received twenty-six of
the twenty-nine votes cast for that office. There is a dispute as to whether
the term of the incumbent, Good, had expired. A number of voters,
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including the officers of election, testify that they did not know that
such an officer was voted for until the polls had closed and the votes
were counted. Held, that votes cast in such a manner can confer no
title to the office, and cannot entitle the relator to the interposition of
this court in his attempt to obtain possession of it, or to displace the
incumbent: ,8tate ex rel. Bolton v. Good, 12 Vroom.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
Damage to Property not taken for Public Use.-To be recoverable,
must be physical and real, and not speculative, and it must depreciate
the value of the property or its use. The depreciation is to be deter-
mined by comparing its value before and after the structure which pro-
duces the injury, and any benefits thus conferred should be considered
as well as the injury inflicted by the structure in estimating the dam-
ages: 0. M. & St. P. Railroad Co. v. Eall, 90 Ills
EQUITY.
Bill of Review- When it can be Filed.-Before a bill of review can
be filed the decree must be first obeyed and performed: Ricker v. Pow-
ell, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
When such a bill is founded both on newly-discovered matter and on
errors of law, it can only be filed by leave of the court: Id.
1'raud-Representatons calculated to deceive.-Representations made
with knowledge that they will be received in a sense that makes them
deceptive, constitute fraud: Match v. Runt, 38 Mich.
Equity takes cognisance of cases in which a party is deceived as to
material things, by means fitted to cause the deception, and which the
party using them had reason to know actually caused it: Id.
Parol misrepresentations are not so merged in written ones as to be
excluded from evidence, in an action for fraud: Id.
. ERRORS AND APPEALS.
Authentication of Record.-Since the Act of June 8th 1872 (17 Stat.
330 ; Rev. Stat. 558, 624, 678), authorizing the appointment of deputies
of the clerks of the Courts of the United States, a transcript of the
record is sufficiently authenticated for purposes of appeal if it is signed by
the deputy in the name of and for the clerk and sealed with the seal of
the court: Garneau v. Dozier, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
Joint and several Appellants-Separate Bonds-Practice.-In eject-
ment, against numerous defendants, there was a judgment against all of
them jointly for the recovery of the land, and separate judgments against
certain of them for damages, for withholding the specific portions found
to be in their respective possession. A writ of error was taken by all
the defendants jointly; Held, that the court below might take from one
Df the defendants a separate bond, with security for the amount of the
separate judgment, against him, and stay proceedings against the land
which had been found to be in his senarate possession: Exparte French,
S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
EVIDENCE. See Eguity.
Vo. XXVIII.- 8
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FIXTURES.
Fixtures brought within a Mortgage.-A mortgage included with the
real estate the manufacturing establishment and buildings for the pur
pose to be erected thereon. The lessees of the factory, after putting ir
machinery, purchased the reversion of the land on which it stood, sub-
ject to the mortgage. field, that they united the title to the realty and
fixtures in one person, and the fixtures became subject to the mortgage:
Jones v. Detroit Chair Co., 38 Mich.
FOREIGIT CORPORATION.
Jurisdiction over.-In assumpsit by residents of New Hampshire on
a policy of insurance against fire, issued in Vermont for the benefit of
plaintiffs, on property in Vermont, by an insurance company that was
incorporated and organized under the laws of Massachusetts, and that
had complied with the requirements of No. 1, Sts. 1874, the writ was
served on one of the insurance commissioners, in accordance with sect.
8 of that statute. Beld, that the court thereby acquired jurisdiction of
defendant, and that it made no difference that plaintiffs resided out of
the state: Osborne v. Shawmut Ins. Co., 51 Vt.
FORMER ADJUDICATION.
t;ontract-Breacn-Damages.-Plaintiff agreed "to construct all the
culvert masonry, cattle-passes, paving and excavating foundation pits"
on certain sections of railroad, for which defendants agreed to pay at pre-
scribed rates. Defendants discharged plaintiff from performance before
it was completed, and plaintiff brought an action for loss of prospective
profit on that part of the work that he was not permitted to do, but, in
alleging the agreement to do the work, he omitted to include the paving
in the enumeration of the several kinds of work, so that it was not alleged
that he agreed to do the paving, nor that defendants agreed that he
might do it, but merely that defendants agreed to pay him at a certain
rate for what he did. On that declaration plaintiff was adjudged enti-
tled to recover for loss of profit on culvert masonry. &c., but not on pav-
ing, and for the latter be thereupon brought another action. .ield,
adjudicated: Morey v. King, 51 Vt.
FRAUD. See Equity.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Equity- When it will Interfere.-The fraud against which equity will
grant relief, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds, consists in the
refusal to perform an agreement upon the faith of which the plaintiff
has been misled to his injury, or the defendant has secured an uncon-
scionable advantage, and not in the mere moral wrong involved in a
refusal to perform a contract, which, by reason of the Statute of Frauds,
can not be enforced by action: Watson v. Erb, 33 Ohio St.
A., in pursuance of a parol engagement for that purpose with B., who
desired to become the owner of a certain tract of land adjoining his, and
for personal reasons was not to be known in the transaction, but was to
save A. harmless from all loss or trouble, purchased the land, made a
cash payment thereon, took the title in fee to himself, as per the agree-
ment, and gave to the seller his own several promissory notes and mort.
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gage back, to secure the deferred payments. After the contracting for
the land, but before making the cash payment or receiving the title, A.
repudiated his agency, and gave notice to B. that he would purchase for
himself, with his own money, and refused to receive from B. the money
to make the cash payment, but consummated the purchase for himself.
Held, that the breach of the verbal contract to convey to B. is not such
a fraud upon him as authorizes a court of equity to decree a trust in the
land, and compel its execution: Id.
Even if such contract could be enforced in equity, it could not be
done until adequate indemnity was tendered against the notes and mort-
gage of A. outstanding, as well as an offer to pay or refund the cash
payment: Id.
HIGHWAY.
Injury on liglhway- Contributory Neyligence.-In case for injury ona
public highway, it appeared that the injury was received on a winter road
between fifteen and thirty rods in length that ran along by the regular
highway and connected with it at each end, and had been generally tra-
velled during part of each winter for thirty or forty years, when the
regular highway was impassable from drifts, and had been broken out
by the highway surveyor at different times for thirteen years next before
the injury complained of, and had been repaired by him within a week
of that time. There was no evidence that it was ever opened by the
selectmen or by their direction, or in any way, except as above. Hield,
that it was inferable that the road was so broken out, used, and repaired
by authority of the selectmen, and that the plaintiff might recover as
for an injury received on a public highway on a declaration alleging the
injury to have been so received: Coates v. Town of Canaan, 51 Vt.
The injury was claimed to have been caused by a cradle-hole and a
snow.drift extending diagonally across the travelled track of the road.
Plaintiff testified that he had known of the condition of the road and
the existence of the cradle-hole for three weeks, and knew that the
place in question was a dangerous place. Held, that plaintiff was not
necessarily guilty of negligence in driving into the cradle-hole, and that
in driving into and through it he was bound to the exercise of ordinary
care only-such care as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise
under like circumstances: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Liability of Husband for Necessaries.--To recover of a husband
who lives apart from his wife for necessaries furnished to the wife, it
must be shown that they live apart either by mutual consent or by rea-
son of the fault of the husband. Thus, where plaintiffs sought to
recover for medicine furnished to a wife on a physician's prescription
while she was living apart from her husband under circumstances
showing that she had deserted him without apparent fault on his part,
it was held that the wife could not pledge the husband's credit, and that
the plaintiffs could not recover : DTorne v. Kathan, 51 Vt.
INJUNCTION. See Waters and Watercourses.
To restraia a Provoked Iijury Denied-Nuisance.--Injunctions are
to prevent irreparable mischief and stay consequefices that could not be
adequately compensated; their allowance is discretionary and not of
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right, calls for good faith in the petitioner: and may be withheld if
likely to inflict greater injury than the grievance complained of: Ed-
wards v. Allouez Mining Co., 38 Mich.
It is an irreparable injury to create intolerable smells near the home-
stead of a neighbor, or undermine his house by excavations, or cut him
off from the street by buildings or ditches, or otherwise destroy the
comfortable, peaceful and quiet occupation of his homestead; also, to
break up his business, destroy its good-will and inflict damages that can-
not be measured because the elements of reasonable certainty are want-
ing in computing them. A nuisance may threaten irreparable injury
even to unoccupied land where it is devoted to some special use or
where the person causing the nuisance is irresponsible: Id.
Where, by inviting an injury, one places himself in a position to call
for an equitable remedy, his motives can be inquired into, even though
he grounds himself on strict legal right: .d.
A man bought for speculation certain bottom lands upon which large
quantities of sand were being deposited by a stream which operated a
stamp-mill higher up. He put a valuation upon the land of from three
to five times what it cost him and tried to sell it to the corporation that
owned the mill, but it declined to buy. Then he prayed for an injunc-
tion to restrein the corporation from sanding his land and polluting the
stream. Hield, that an injunction would not lie, and that the specula-
tor was entitled to such remedy as the law would give him and no more:
Id.
INSURANCE.
Who may Sue on a Policy of Insurance-Burning by one not Inter-
ested in the Policy.-On a policy of insurance issued to A. and B.
against loss by fire, which contains a provision "loss if any, first pay-
able to A. as his interest may appear," where B. paid no part of the
premium and was not aware the policy had been issued, A. may main-
tain an action in his own name for any loss he may sustain. The per-
son who pays the premium and to whom the loss is payable is the
proper party to sue for the loss: Westchester Fire Ins. Co.v. Foster,
90 Ill.
The fact that a person having no interest in a policy of insurance
caused the building insured to be burned, without the knowledge or
assent of the assured, cannot affect the right of the latter to recover for
the loss: Id.
INTEREST.
Judgment against the United States-Court of Claims.-The Court
of Claims has no power to give judgment against the United States
for interest on a claim, although it appears that payments on the con-
tracts held by the claimant had been unreasonably delayed : Rllson v.
United States, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
JURY.
Misconduct of- What will be sufficient to vitiate a Verdict.-Where
there has been irregularity or misconduct on the part of the jury, which
might affect its judgment, or improperly influence the verdict, a new
trial should be granted. Where, however, it clearly appears that no
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improper effect could arise from the alleged misconduct, the verdict
should stand: Armleder v. Lieberman, 12 Vroom.
A separation of the jurors, after the jury has retired to the jury-room
to consider of the verdict, induced by a sudden alarm of fire in the near
vicinity of the jury-room, is not, of itself, such misconduct as will vitiate
the verdict made on reassembling: Id.
A juror separated from his fellows, and privately asked an attorney,
in no way connected with the case or parties thereto, " How are we to
get along without those books or papers ?"-saying, "they have not let
us have them." To which the attorney replied, in substance: You must
do the best you can; he could give him no advice; that the juror could
send up and have the court advise them. Held, although such conduct
on the part of the juror was a violation of his duty, yet, as it did not
show any bias or prejudice for or against either party, that would affect
tho verdict, it was not sufficient cause for a new trial: .d.
LrBEL.
Newspaper-Negligence of Publisher-Damages.-The publication
of court proceedings is not so far privileged as to justify a sensational
accompaniment of defamatory comments upon the character of those in
relation to whom the proceedings are taken: Scri)mps v. Reilly, 38 Mich.
Where there is evidence tending to show that the proprietor of a
newspaper has retained employees who ought not to have been kept, and
that through their recklessness or malice a libel has been published, the
proprietor will be held liable; but the burden of proving such negligence
is on the plaintiff: Id.
Every publisher in whose paper a libel appears is liable for estimated
damages to credit and reputation, and such special damages as may ap-
pear, and also for such damages on account of injured feelings as must
be inferred considering the standing and circulation of the paper: Id.
Damages for% injury to the feelings are allowed where the act is mis.
chievous in its very nature, or where there is malice, wilful or wanton
misconduct, or negligence so great as to indicate a reckless disregard of
the rights or safety of the injured party; they are measured largely by
the degree of fault, and where there is no malice or negligence and
injury happened in spite of proper precaution, they are reduced to what
would have resulted from the injury itself: Id.
In an action for newspaper libel, the haste incident to issuing the
paper, the time at which the libellous article was handed in, and the suf-
ficiency of the force employed on the paper for gathering the news and
preparing and supervising articles for publication, may be considered as
bearing on the question of the publisher's negligence: Id.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
When the Statute begins to run.-Where materials are furnished from
time to time, under a special contract to furnish the iron work necessary
for a building, and the special contract is abandoned before its full per-
formance, by reason of the destruction of the building in an incomplete
state, in an action as upon a quantum meruit, the Statute of Limitations
will begin to run as against each item or parcel from the time of its de-
livery, the same as though the materials had been delivered without any
special contract at all: Schillo v. McEwen, 90 Ills.
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MIANDAMUS.
Against Corporation- Who should be served-Enforcement by Attach-
ment.-If the duty commanded is incumbent upon a corporation, the writ
should be directed either to the corporation or to the select body within
the corporation, whose province and duty it is to perform the particular
act, or put the necessary machinery in motion to secure its performance,
and the return must be made by those to whom the writ is directed:
State ex rel. v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 12 Vroom.
The only means of compelling a return to a writ of mandamus, or
obedience to its command, is by attachment, which will only go against
such persons as have been served with the writ; therefore, to make the
writ efficacious, it must be served upon the officers of the corporation
who have the power, and whose duty it is to execute it, and against
whom an attachment to enforce obedience 
may issue: Td.
A return must be made to a peremptory writ of mandamus as well as
to the alternative. The difference is only.in the substance of the return
In either case the court will require a return, under penalty of an attach-
ment: Id.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Railroad-Injury to Employee-Neqligence.-Where a railroad com,-
pany, engaged in ballasting its road, employed a hand to assist in loading
and unloading a gravel train, and in the execution of this service it was
necessary for him to ride on the train from the gravel pit to the place
of unloading, the train being run under the direction of a conductor, and
said hand having nothing to do with its management; Held, that such
hand, while riding on the train, was a mere employee, and did not as.
sume -the character of a passenger; that he and the engineer of the
train were engaged in a common service, and that, as he was not under
the control or subject to the orders of the engineer, the railroad company
can not be held liable for negligence of the engineer, resulting in his
death, if it was not guilty of negligence in selecting the engineer : .Kum-
ler v. Junction'Railroad Co., 33 Ohio St.
MmL-OWNER. See Waters and Watercourses.
MORTGAGE. See Fixtures.
Deed absolute on its Face-Disposing of Equity of Redemption by
private Sale.-A deed having been given, absolute upon its face, the
grantor claimed it was a mortgage; in a proceeding to establish that
claim, it was competent for the grantee to show, that although originally
a mortgage, the equity of redemption had been released by a parol agree-
ment: Shaw v. Wdlbridge, 33 Ohio St.
There is no rule of law which prevents a mortgagor from disposing
of his equity of redemption to a mortgagee by private arrangement, but
courts of equity wiHl not permit a mortgagee to take advantage of his
position so as to wrest from the mortgagor his equity, by an unconscion-
able bargain. The transaction will be jealously scrutinized, but if the
agreement is a faii one, under all the circumstances of the case, it will
be upheld: Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See Highway; Master and Servant.
Contributory.-Where the plaintiff, seeking to recover for a personal
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injury sustained from a fall by stepping into a hole in a sidewalk, knew
of the defect in the walk, and was watching to observe it, but it being
covered with snow, and a snow storm prevailing at the time, with a high
wind, driving the snow in her face so that she did not discover it until
she stepped into the hole, and it appearing that other walks leading in
the direction of her home were equally uusafe, it was held, that she was
not guilty of such negligence as would preclude a right of recovery for
the injury: City of Aurora v. Dale, 90 Ills.
NUISANCE. See Injunction.
PARTNERSHIP. See Bills and Notes.
Election of Creditor to proceed against Estate of deceased Partner, or
against Survivor.-A partnership debt being joint and several, the cred-
itor has the right to elect whether to proceed against the assets in the
hands of the surviving partner, or against the estate of the deceased
member, nor will the laches of the creditor in following the assets of the
firm, preclude a recovery against the estate of the deceased partner:
Silvermrn v. Chase, 90 Ills.
Survivor entitled to Partnership Assets.-A surviving partner is enti-
t!ed to use the real estate of the partnership as firm assets so far as it is
needed to settle the affairs of the firm, and decedent's, heirs hold the
legal estate only as trustees fbr the equitable purposes of the firm : .fer-
•'itt v. Dice' y, 38 3Mich.
RAILROAD. See Damages; Master and Servant.
RECEIVER.
Title of-Effect of placing Corporate Property in Hands of.-Placing
the property of a corporation in charge of a receiver does not work its
dissolution, nor is the title of the property changed; a power only is
delegated to take charge of it and sell it: State, N. J. Southern Rail-
road Co., prosecutors, v. Railroad Commissioners, 12 Vroom.
The receiver of a corporation, appointed by the Court of Chancery,
takes its property, including its franchises, in the same condition and
subject to all the duties, obligations and liabilities that rested upon the
corporation itself; and, in the administration of his office, is under obli.
gation for the performance of every duty and obligation imposed upon
the corporation by its charter or by the general laws of the state: Id.
SALE.
Increase of Animals conditionatly Sold.-Where an animal is sold on
condition that it shall remain the property of the vendor until perform-
ance of certain agreements by the vendee, the title to such of the in-
crease of the animal as accrues before the performance of the condition
will be in the vendor: Clark v. Hayward, 51 Vt.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Payment of part of Purchase-Aloney.-To authorize a decree for
specific performance, on the ground that the party seeking it had con-
tributed to the purchase-money, such contribution must be a definitely
ascertainable portion thereof, and the contract, specific performance of
which is sought, must so far describe the premises claimed, that the
court may ascertain what they are: Maud v. Maud, 33 Ohio St.
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SURETY.
Recovery by Surety of Usurious Interest Paid for Princ)Tal.-A
surety on a promissory note, who becomes such at the request of the
principal, and, with him, agrees to pay interest thereon at a greater than
the lawful rate, and who pays the note after it has fallen due, with inter-
est at the agreed rate, may recover of the principal the money he so
pays, it being paid, as betiveen him and the principal, at the request and
for the use of the principal; and it makes no difference that a part
thereof was usurious interest and not collectible of the surety, nor that
a part was usurious interest that accrued after the note matured: Jack-
son v. Jackson, 51 Vt.
TRADE-MARKS.
Constitutional Law- Validity of Statutes for Protection of Trade-
marks.-A trade-mark is not an invention or discovery, within the mean-
ing of the clause of the Constitution empowering Congress to secure to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their inventions and discov-
eries : Uinited States v. Stefens, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879. [And
see L'idersdorf v. Flint, 18 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 37.]
If trade-marks are within congressional control at all, under the power
to regulate commerce (a question left undecided), the existing statutes
for their protection are invalid because not limited in operation to the
use of trade-marks, in those classes of commerce over which Congress is
given control, viz., commerce with foreign nations, among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes : Id.
Nor can these statutes be supported to the extent of the use of trade-
marks in such commerce because their language is general in its opera-
tion, and Congress might have been unwilling to have passed laws only
partial in their operation. In such cases, it is impossible to separate thb
constitutional and unconstitutional parts of the statutes: Id.
UNITED STATES. See Interest.
USURY. See Surety.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
Injunctivn to regulate the relative Rights.-A court of equity cannot
define and secure the rights of one litigant without reference to the cor-
responding rights of the other: loxsie v. Hozsie, 38 Mich.
A mill-owner is not entitled to protection against incidental injuries
or inconveniences arising from the lawful use of the same stream by
another mill-owner higher up: Id.
An injunction restraining an upper mill-owner from allowing the
water to flow over his dam in quantities greater than is required to run
his machinery, but requiring him to allow it to flow into another's mill-
pond to the amount of the natural flow of the stream, is erroneous, be-
cause it discriminates in favor of the lower owner: Id.
Injunction ought not to be granted to regulate the relative rights of
mill-owners upon'the same stream, except in very clear cases of the in-
tentional violation of those rights; the parties should be left to recover
their damages at law: Id.
